In this essay I will examine Schopenhauer’s contention that there is, in fact, no hap-piness, and that instead it is merely a lack of suffering that we label as such. To do this,I will first explore the claim itself, as well as some additional hypotheses and argumentsthat Schopenhauer presents for this position. I will then make a number of objectionsand provide refutations for each of them, with the resulting conclusion being favourablefor Schopenhauer’s position; however, I will also comment on some areas of philosophythat could possibly yield problems for the position, as well as discussing briefly whatsorts of further conclusions might be drawn from the nonexistence of happiness, andwhich areas are clearly not affected by it without further argumentation.

In this paper I will describe and attempt to resolve one of the main problems ofDavid Benatar’s textBetter Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence:whether it is possible for a right not to exist to be posited without there ever being aperson in existence to hold such a right. I will conclude that this is indeed possiblegiven an experience oriented view of personhood that I shall outline, and what otherconclusions might be drawn from such a view.