A collection of papers & books making arguments for antinatalism
By Type: Book (5) Paper (50) View All →
By Topic: AI (1) Animals (3) Antifrustrationism (1) Asymmetry (12) Consent (5) Harm To Others (7) History (1) Risk-based (7) Utilitarianism (2)
By Author: David Benatar (9) Gerald Harrison (4) Matti Häyry (4) Jeroen Robbert Zandbergen (3) Asheel Singh (3) View All →
Published and peer-reviewed papers about antinatalism and procreative ethics.
Paper by Ben Bradley, published on September 15, 2012 in The Journal of Ethics
It is often said that while we have a strong reason not to create someone who will be badly off, we have no strong reason for creating someone who will be well off. In this paper I argue that this asymmetry is incompatible with a plausible principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives, and that a more general asymmetry between harming and benefiting is difficult to defend. I then argue that, contrary to what many have claimed, it is possible to harm or benefit someone by bringing her into existence.
Paper LinkNo open access PDF link available.
Paper by Jeff McMahan, published on September 13, 2012 in The Journal of Ethics
Most people are skeptical of the claim that the expectation that a person would have a life that would be well worth living provides a reason to cause that person to exist. In this essay I argue that to cause such a person to exist would be to confer a benefit of a noncomparative kind and that there is a moral reason to bestow benefits of this kind. But this conclusion raises many problems, among which is that it must be determined how the benefits conferred on people by causing them to exist weigh against comparable benefits conferred on existing people. In particular, might the reason to cause people to exist ever outweigh the reason to save the lives of existing people?
Paper LinkNo open access PDF link available.
Paper by Gerald Harrison, published on April 15, 2012 in South African Journal of Philosophy
Harrison shows an argument for antinatalism based on Davind Benatar’s procreational asymmetry, which he finds superior because it does not depend on the view that coming into existence is always a harm for the created being.
His argument is based on the moral duty to prevent pain as well as the duty to promote pleasure. However, since duties need a victim, he suggests that only the former applies to the act of procreation and thus:
Harrison concludes that other things being equal, these generate a duty not to procreate.
Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it achieves a better fit with our intuitions; it does not require us to acknowledge that life is a harm, or that a world devoid of life is a good thing; and it is easy to see why it does not have any pro-mortalist implications.
I believe closer inspection reveals that there is a positive duty not to procreate, other things being equal. Consider, we have already seen that the pleasures contained in a potential life are not pleasures anyone has a prima facie duty to create: no one would be wronged by the failure to create him. But there is a prima facie duty to prevent the (inevitable) pains contained in any potential life. Thus, when it comes to creating a new life, even a very happy one, there is a prima facie duty to prevent the suffering it contains but no prima facie duty to create the pleasures.— by Gerald Harrison in "Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties"
Paper by David Benatar, published on January 1, 2012 in South African Journal of Philosophy
Many people are resistant to the conclusions for which I argued in Better Never to Have Been . I have previously responded to most of the published criticisms of my arguments. Here I respond to a new batch of critics (and to some fellow anti-natalists) who gathered for a conference at the University of Johannesburg and whose papers are published in this special issue of the South African Journal of Philosophy . I am also taking the opportunity to respond to two other critics whose articles have previously been published in South African philosophy journals. Clearly I cannot respond to all the arguments in each of these papers and thus I shall focus on what I take to be some of the central issues in each. None of the arguments to which I shall respond have caused me to revise my views. However, I am pleased to have the opportunity to show why this is the case
Paper by Christopher Belshaw, published on January 1, 2012 in South African Journal of Philosophy
Consider the view that coming into existence is bad for us. Can we hold this and yet deny that ceasing to exist would be good for us? I argue that we can. First, many animals have lives such that they would be better off not existing. Second, if persons and babies are distinct things then the same is true of babies. Third, even if persons and babies are not distinct things – rather they are phases that human beings go through – still it is bad for babies that they come into existence. So it was bad for us to come into existence. But most of us now enjoy worthwhile lives. So it would be bad for us, now, to cease to exist
Paper LinkNo open access PDF link available.
Paper by Asheel Singh, published on January 1, 2012 in South African Journal of Philosophy
Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence. This view is most famously defended by David Benatar (1997, 2006). There are, however, other routes to an anti-natal conclusion. In this respect, Seana Shiffrin’s paper, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm” (1999), has been rather neglected in the natal debate. Though she appears unwilling to conclude that procreation is always wrong, I believe that she in fact puts forth a case for anti-natalism no less compelling than Benatar’s. My overall aim here is to demonstrate the force of her argument by defending a Shiffrin-esque route to anti-natalism from a powerful objection. This objection appeals to the common belief that because most people endorse their creation, procreation often is all-things-considered permissible. I will show how this objection fails, and why Shiffrin’s rationale for anti-natalism, as I will be representing it, ought to be taken seriously.
Paper LinkNo open access PDF link available.
Paper by Julio Cabrera, published on June 3, 2011 in Revista Redbioética/UNESCO
In his book, Better Never to Have Been (Oxford, 2006), David Benatar attempts to show that coming into existence is always a serious harm. In order to prove his point, he develops two lines of argument, one formal, another material. In this paper I intend to show that: (1) There is a logical problem in the formal argumentation that affects the soundness of the supposed “asymmetry” between the absence of pleasure and the absence of pain, which constitutes the core of this line of argumentation. (2) Although the material argument is basically correct, I maintain that it suffers from the limitations of the theoretical approach adopted, of empiricist and Utilitarian type. (3) I discuss briefly the alleged “independence” of the two lines of argument trying to show that the formal line depends on the material one
Paper by Manolito Gallegos, published on March 21, 2011 in Heidelberger Graduiertenjournal für Geisteswissenschaften
In this essay I will examine Schopenhauer’s contention that there is, in fact, no hap-piness, and that instead it is merely a lack of suffering that we label as such. To do this,I will first explore the claim itself, as well as some additional hypotheses and argumentsthat Schopenhauer presents for this position. I will then make a number of objectionsand provide refutations for each of them, with the resulting conclusion being favourablefor Schopenhauer’s position; however, I will also comment on some areas of philosophythat could possibly yield problems for the position, as well as discussing briefly whatsorts of further conclusions might be drawn from the nonexistence of happiness, andwhich areas are clearly not affected by it without further argumentation.
Paper by Manolito Gallegos, published on January 1, 2011 in Heidelberger Graduiertenjournal für Geisteswissenschaften
In this paper I will describe and attempt to resolve one of the main problems ofDavid Benatar’s textBetter Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence:whether it is possible for a right not to exist to be posited without there ever being aperson in existence to hold such a right. I will conclude that this is indeed possiblegiven an experience oriented view of personhood that I shall outline, and what otherconclusions might be drawn from such a view.
Paper by Gerald Harrison & Julia Tanner, published on December 21, 2010 in Think
Most people take it for granted that it's morally permissible to have children. They may raise questions about the number of children it's responsible to have or whether it's permissible to reproduce when there's a strong risk of serious disability. But in general, having children is considered a good thing to do, something that's morally permissible in most cases (perhaps even obligatory).