In his paper Magnusson analyzes several risk-based arguments for antinatalism, before arriving at the following version of one, which he considers the most robust:

1. It is impermissible to non-consensually impose a risk of catastrophic harm on others unless doing so is necessary to advance their essential interests
2. Bringing a child into existence involves non-consensually imposing a risk of catastrophic harm on that child that is not necessary to advance their essential interests; therefore,
3. It is impermissible to bring children into existence.

According to this argument, procreation is impermissible because it involves imposing a risk of catastrophic harm on the resultant child that is not necessary to advance their essential interests. This type of argument notably departs from the tenets of Benatar’s other arguments for anti-natalism—it does not assume that existence is always comparative worse than non-existence nor does it assume that existence is always non-comparatively bad—though given the controversy surrounding those arguments and the subsequent need to develop an independent risk-based argument, this counts as a significant advantage.