A collection of papers & books making arguments for antinatalism
By Type: Book (5) Paper (51) View All →
By Topic: AI (1) Animals (3) Antifrustrationism (1) Asymmetry (12) Consent (5) Harm To Others (7) History (1) Risk-based (7) Utilitarianism (2)
By Author: David Benatar (9) Gerald Harrison (4) Matti Häyry (4) Jeroen Robbert Zandbergen (3) Asheel Singh (3) View All →
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Paper by Rehan Pieter Visser, published on July 1, 2018 in University of the Witwatersrand
The morality of space colonisation is yet to receive thorough examination from philosophers. I seek to address this deficit by making a case against colonising space. This case rests on a defence of antinatalism through four arguments (an argument from Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative; David Benatar’s axiological asymmetry argument; Benatar’s argument from quality of life; and Benatar’s misanthropic argument) and an accompanying stance in favour of (non-objectionable) extinction. I respond to challenges and objections against both positions and show that they fail. Because space colonisation, if successful, will likely extend humanity’s lifespan, this makes it a morally indefensible activity, insofar as it entails suffering on the part of sentient beings. I consequently argue that space colonisation ought to be prohibited. I recommend that this prohibition take the form of various additions and changes to existing international space law
Paper by Brian Zager, published on May 1, 2018 in Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication
Offering a pointed response to the perennial question of being, those sympathetic to the philosophical posture of antinatalism proclaim the suffering of the world does not ultimately justify bringing life into it, consequently advancing a moral stance towards procreation. As this particular topic of conversation is unlikely to curry favor with a majority of interlocutors, the antinatalist-as-rhetor faces a seemingly Sisyphean task in issuing a harsh alternative to the more pervasive narrative espousing birth as an occasion for celebration. Cautious to dismiss antinatalism as simply a profane social discourse, I first consider its communicative import as type of tragic rhetoric which identifies birth as a phenomenological disaster that warrants more critical appraisal. Additionally, I examine the utility of embracing a performative writing style to explore this topic insofar as it adds rhetorical dimension to the attempt at communicating the horrors of existence.
Paper LinkNo open access PDF link available.
Paper by Sayma H. Chowdhury & Todd K. Shackelford, published on May 1, 2017 in Evolutionary Psychological Science
Although Ng (2016) addresses the important question of how to increase animal welfare, he does not address an equally important question—how to prevent animal suffering. The best way to prevent animal suffering is to stop breeding them. With fewer sentient beings in existence, net suffering is lessened. Even if captive animals were bred with a guarantee of “net happiness,” they would still suffer at some point in their lives and sometimes very much. We argue that not only is nonexistence preferable to existence but also that even in research there are many preferable alternatives to the use of captive animals.
Paper LinkNo open access PDF link available.
Paper by Gerald Harrison & Julia Tanner, published on September 1, 2016 in The Philosophers' Magazine
Most people take it for granted that it's morally permissible to have children. They may raise questions about the number of children it's responsible to have or whether it's permissible to reproduce when there's a strong risk of serious disability. But in general, having children is considered a good thing to do, something that's morally permissible in most cases (perhaps even obligatory).
Paper LinkNo open access PDF link available.
Paper by Tina Rulli, published on June 6, 2016 in Philosophy Compass
It is widely assumed that people have a moral right to procreate. This article explores recent arguments in opposition to procreation in some or all contexts. Some such views are concerned with the risks and harms of life that procreation imposes on non-consenting children. Others articulate concerns for third parties – the environmental damage or opportunity costs that procreation poses to already existing people. The article then surveys arguments that favor procreation despite the risks to the children created and third parties. The best argument for procreation is based on the significant interest people have in forming the parent–child relationship. An important under-discussed middle ground is suggested – one that avoids the criticisms of the anti-natalist while fulfilling the best aims of procreation – viz. adoption. The duty to adopt is summarized and objections to it considered. Thoughtful people who deeply desire to become parents but do not wish to participate in the range of potential procreative harms should consider adoption as a first choice.
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Paper by Heiko Puls, published on February 1, 2016 in Kantian Review
In his applied moral philosophy, Kant formulates the parents’ duty to make their child happy. I argue that, for Kant, this duty is an ad hoc attempt at compensating for the parental guilt of having brought a person into the condition of existence – and hence also having created her need for happiness – on their own initiative. I argue that Kant’s considerations regarding parental duties and human reproduction in general imply arguments for an ethically justified anti-natalism, but that this position is abolished in his teleology for meta-ethical reasons.
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Paper by Joseph Levy, published on January 1, 2016 in Ephemeris: The Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy
No abstract found.
Paper by David Benatar, published on September 1, 2015 in Oxford University Press
This chapter advances a misanthropic moral argument for anti-natalism. According to this argument, we have a presumptive duty to desist from bringing into existence new members of species that cause vast amounts of harm. Extensive evidence is provided to show that human nature has a dark side that leads humans to cause vast amounts of pain, suffering, and death to other humans and to non-human animals. Some of this harm is mediated by destruction of the environment. The resultant presumptive duty we have not to create new humans is very rarely if ever defeated. Not all misanthropy is about humans’ moral failings. The chapter is followed by an appendix, in which aesthetic considerations against procreating are advanced.
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Book by David Benatar & David Wasserman, published on May 21, 2015 in Oxford University Press
In this book, two sides of the debate on the ethics of procreation are presented. One argues for the anti-natalist view that procreation is never morally permissible. In support of that conclusion he advances a number of arguments. These include: an argument based on an axiological asymmetry between harm and benefit; an argument based on the poor quality of all human life and the risk of serious harm; and a misanthropic argument based on the harm that humans do. The second half of the book identifies a variety of moderate pro-natalist positions, which all see procreation as sometimes permissible but never required. After criticizing the leading anti-natalist arguments, focusing on the first and second arguments presented in the first half of the book, the second half considers moderate pro-natalist views that vary in permissiveness. It argues that constraints on procreation are best understood in terms of the role morality of prospective parents; reviews different views of that role morality; and argues for one that imposes only limited constrains based on the well-being of the future child. The second half of the book then contends that the expected good of a future child and of the parent-child relationship can provide a strong justification for procreation in the face of expected adversities without giving individuals any moral reason to procreate.
Paper by Stuart Rachels, published on September 17, 2013 in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
This paper defends the Famine Relief Argument against Having Children, which goes as follows: conceiving and raising a child costs hundreds of thousands of dollars; that money would be far better spent on famine relief; therefore, conceiving and raising children is immoral. It is named after Peter Singer’s Famine Relief Argument because it might be a special case of Singer’s argument and because it exposes the main practical implication of Singer’s argument—namely, that we should not become parents. I answer five objections: that disaster would ensue if nobody had children; that having children cannot be wrong because it is so natural for human beings; that the argument demands too much of us; that my child might be a great benefactor to the world; and that we should raise our children frugally and give them the right values rather than not have them. Previous arguments against procreation have appealed either to a pessimism about human life, or to the environmental impact of overpopulation, or to the fact that we cannot obtain the consent of the non-existent. The argument proposed here appeals to the severe opportunity costs of parenting.
Paper LinkNo open access PDF link available.