Paper by Christoph Fehige, published on January 1, 1998 in Preferences
How good or bad is a world? Let us assume, as so often, that this is a matter solely of the preferences it contains and of their frustration and satisfaction. One question we shall then have to face is how the existence of a preference and its satisfaction compares to the non-existence of this preference: is it better, or worse, or just as good, or sometimes one and sometimes the other? Section 1 will argue at length that, ceteris paribus, the two options - satisfied preference and no preference - are equally good, a doctrine we can call antifrustrationism. This settled, sections 2 to 7 will begin to translate antifrustrationism into moral principles, and to investigate the consequences.
We don't do any good by creating satisfied extra preferences. What matters about preferences is not that they have a satisfied existence, but that they don't have a frustrated existence. Let us call this result antifrustrationism. (...) Maximizers of preference satisfaction should instead call themselves minimizers of preference frustration.— by Christoph Fehige in "A Pareto Principle for Possible People"
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Preferences De Gruyter, 1998, pp. 508-543